Eliciting truthful reports with partial signals in repeated games

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-39344-0_4MaRDI QIDQ6535799zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Y. T. Wu, Ali Khodabakhsh, Bo Li, E. Nikolova, E. Pountourakis

Publication date 28 February 2024

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39344-0_4

zbMATH Keywords

electricity marketenergy economicsequilibrium analysispenalty mechanismsrepeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

Recommendations

• Eliciting truthful reports with partial signals in repeated games
• Lies and slander: truth-telling in repeated matching games with private monitoring
• Putting peer prediction under the micro(economic)scope and making truth-telling focal
• Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games
• The communication cost of selfishness

Cites work

• Strategic classification

Cited in

(1)

• Eliciting truthful reports with partial signals in repeated games

This page was built for publication: Eliciting truthful reports with partial signals in repeated games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6535799)