The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.011zbMath1281.91070MaRDI QIDQ2455666

I. R. Segal'

Publication date: 26 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.011

zbMATH Keywords

verification; stability; approximation; Pareto efficiency; communication complexity; social choice rules; informational efficiency; combinatorial auctions; indivisible goods; price mechanisms; envy-free allocations; convex economies; message space dimension; nondeterministic communication; stable many-to-one matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

The communication cost of selfishness, Counting combinatorial choice rules, Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof, A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues, Subquadratic algorithms for succinct stable matching

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