Excess functions and nucleolus allocations of pure exchange economies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1191818
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90015-8zbMath0755.90008MaRDI QIDQ1191818
Andrew Postlewaite, Richard P. McLean
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90015-8
Related Items
A prekernel characterization by means of stability properties, The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets, An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments, The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies, THE CORE COINCIDES WITH THE NUCLEOLUS ALLOCATIONS IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY WITH TAXATION
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- On the Existence and Interpretation of Value Allocation
- Existence of Approximate Equilibria and Cores
- Excess Functions for Cooperative Games without Sidepayments
- An Elementary Core Equivalence Theorem
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market
- The Coefficient of Resource Utilization