Incentive compatibility and informational requirements

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90160-1zbMATH Open0542.90003OpenAlexW2080061319MaRDI QIDQ795694FDOQ795694

Authors: Stefan Reichelstein 

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90160-1

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zbMATH Keywords

message spacedominant strategydecentralized allocation proceduresincentive compatibility constraintsinformational requirements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
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• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
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• On the informational size of message spaces for resource allocation processes
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• On the informational size of message spaces

Cited In (13)

• A lower bound on computational complexity given by revelation mechanisms
• The communication cost of selfishness
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Rights and Decentralized Computation
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
• A method for constructing message systems for smooth performance functions
• Optimal intertemporal allocation mechanisms and decentralization of decisions
• Incentive-compatible cost-allocation schemes
• Price-quantity duality in planning procedures
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Communication requirements and strategic mechanisms for market organization
• An incentive-compatible resource allocation problem allowing collusion

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