scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3887381
[For the entire collection see Zbl 0513.00016.] In the introduction the author gives a very useful overview of the developments in the theory of incentives, a field which has grown very fast in the last fifteen years. The paper is concerned with following the line of general resouce allocation mechanisms (Hurwicz) and examines the development of incentive theory in the context of a particular model. In the model there exists a medium of compensation, a private good, and a number of equilibrium concepts are considered. A choice mechanism defines an n-person game of incomplete information and this implies that equilibrium concepts such as dominant strategy, Nash and Bayesian equilibria can be considered. The demand-revealing mechanism is formulated under certain conditions on the preferences and then honest revelation of preferences is an equilibrium in the sense of a dominant strategy. The author has contributed to the development of the theory and has also surveyed the area. The paper is recommended especially to those who carry out research in this area and should be read in conjunction with Chapters 2 and 3 in this volume.
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