Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms

DOI10.1007/s00199-021-01342-zzbMath1484.91232OpenAlexW3128191509MaRDI QIDQ825192

Jung S. You, Ruben Juarez

Publication date: 17 December 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01342-z

zbMATH Keywords

implementationenvy-freecost sharingresource sharingVCG mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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