Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy
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Publication:4359771
DOI10.2307/2171885zbMATH Open0898.90014OpenAlexW1986843894MaRDI QIDQ4359771FDOQ4359771
Authors: Marc Fleurbaey, François Maniquet 
Publication date: 8 November 1998
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171885
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no-envystrategy-proofnessequal treatment of equalsnon-bossinessNash implementabilityequity theoryallocation functions
Cited In (15)
- No-envy and Arrow's conditions
- Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
- On the measurement of plutonomy
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- Tax implementability of fair allocations
- Responsibility sensitive egalitarianism and optimal linear income taxation
- Procedurally fair implementation under complete information
- Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations
- The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
- Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies
- Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The no envy approach to compensation
- Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms
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