Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy

DOI10.2307/2171885MaRDI QIDQ4359771zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marc Fleurbaey, François Maniquet

Publication date 8 November 1998

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2171885

zbMATH Keywords

no-envystrategy-proofnessequal treatment of equalsnon-bossinessNash implementabilityequity theoryallocation functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
• Tax implementability of fair allocations
• No-envy in queueing problems
• The equity-efficiency trade-off reconsidered
• Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains

Cited in

(15)

• No-envy and Arrow's conditions
• Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
• On the measurement of plutonomy
• On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
• A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
• Tax implementability of fair allocations
• Responsibility sensitive egalitarianism and optimal linear income taxation
• Procedurally fair implementation under complete information
• Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations
• The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
• Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
• Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies
• Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The no envy approach to compensation
• Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms

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