Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked

DOI10.1007/S10058-009-0092-9MaRDI QIDQ2268911zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors William Thomson

Publication date 15 March 2010

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-009-0092-9

zbMATH Keywords

Maskin monotonicityNash implementabilityno veto powersingle-peaked preferences: uniform rulestrong monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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• Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

Cites work

• A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
• A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• A note on Thomson's characterizations of the uniform rule
• A simple characterization of the uniform rule
• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences
• An alternative characterization of the equal-distance rule for allocation problems with single-peaked preferences
• An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
• Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Division rules and migration equilibria
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 679846 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
• More on the uniform rule: characterizations without Pareto optimality
• Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good
• Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
• Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked
• Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Secure implementation in allotment economies
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• Strategy-proof allotment rules
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts

Cited in

(15)

• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
• Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution
• Double implementation without no-veto-power
• Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
• Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
• A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
• On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
• Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
• Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
• Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences
• Equal treatment of unsatisfied agents
• Strong Nash implementation and economic applications
• Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies

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