A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0096-0zbMATH Open1158.91428OpenAlexW2077063287MaRDI QIDQ2432495FDOQ2432495

Authors: Bettina Klaus 

Publication date: 25 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0096-0

Recommendations

• The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• The role of replication-invariance: two answers concerning the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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• One-sided population monotonicity, separability, and the uniform rule
• Distributional properties of the uniform rule in economies with single-peaked preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems
• An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• A note on Thomson's characterizations of the uniform rule
• A simple characterization of the uniform rule
• Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
• The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems
• One-sided population monotonicity, separability, and the uniform rule

Cited In (6)

• Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
• The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
• The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints
• The role of replication-invariance: two answers concerning the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences

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