A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0096-0zbMath1158.91428OpenAlexW2077063287MaRDI QIDQ2432495

Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 25 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0096-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items

Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods, The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints, The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences, Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked

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