Distributional properties of the uniform rule in economies with single-peaked preferences
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Publication:1978323
Recommendations
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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- Single-peaked preferences, endowments and population-monotonicity.
- An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
Cites work
- Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
- The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
Cited in
(8)- Single-peaked preferences, endowments and population-monotonicity.
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
- Uniform allocation and reallocation revisited
- The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
- A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
- Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences
- More on the uniform rule: characterizations without Pareto optimality
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