The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2010.08.019MaRDI QIDQ617604zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tsuyoshi Adachi

Publication date 21 January 2011

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.08.019

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessuniform rulesingle-peaked preferencesmultiple divisible commodities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
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Cites work

• A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
• A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
• A simple characterization of the uniform rule
• An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• More on the uniform rule: characterizations without Pareto optimality
• Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
• Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules
• Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Secure implementation in allotment economies
• Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
• Single-peaked preferences with several commodities
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences

Cited in

(13)

• Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
• A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
• On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem
• A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution
• Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities
• A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies
• Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions
• Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
• Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences
• On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
• Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible
• Single-peaked preferences with several commodities
• More on the uniform rule: characterizations without Pareto optimality

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