The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.08.019zbMath1232.91359OpenAlexW2088510109MaRDI QIDQ617604

Tsuyoshi Adachi

Publication date: 21 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.08.019

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesssingle-peaked preferencesuniform rulemultiple divisible commodities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

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