Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0301-4zbMath1176.91067OpenAlexW2098360795MaRDI QIDQ1038710

Anirban Kar, Özgür Kıbrıs

Publication date: 20 November 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0301-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions ⋮ Allocation rules on networks ⋮ On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness ⋮ Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked

Cites Work

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• Strategy-proof allotment rules
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• On fixed-path rationing methods.
• Division rules and migration equilibria
• A simple characterization of the uniform rule
• Migration disequilibrium and specific division rules
• Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: an axiomatic analysis
• Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

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