Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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Publication:1332713
DOI10.1006/jeth.1994.1041zbMath0864.90008OpenAlexW2088903596WikidataQ59972922 ScholiaQ59972922MaRDI QIDQ1332713
Publication date: 5 September 1994
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1041
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