When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds
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Publication:765217
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.012zbMATH Open1279.91104OpenAlexW3125237247MaRDI QIDQ765217FDOQ765217
Publication date: 19 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.012
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Cites Work
- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents
- Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
- Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
- An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
- Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: an axiomatic analysis
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: a survey and open questions
- The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
- A simple characterization of the uniform rule
- The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
- Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
Cited In (5)
- Too much of a good thing: decision-making in cases with infinitely many utility contributions
- The division problem under constraints
- Non-bossiness
- The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints
- Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible
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