When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.012MaRDI QIDQ765217zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vikram Manjunath

Publication date 19 March 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.012

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessstrategy-proofnessPareto efficiencyrationingsequential priority ruleslower-bounds

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
• A simple characterization of the uniform rule
• A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents
• An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
• Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
• Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: an axiomatic analysis
• Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
• The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
• Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: a survey and open questions

Cited in

(6)

• Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible
• The division problem under constraints
• Non-bossiness
• Multi-commodity rationing problems with maxmin payoffs
• The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints
• Too much of a good thing: decision-making in cases with infinitely many utility contributions

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Uses Software

• BASS

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