The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2294MaRDI QIDQ1371192zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors William Thomson

Publication date 28 October 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2294

zbMATH Keywords

fair allocation of an infinitely divisible commodityreplacement principlewelfare-domination under preference-replacement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cited in

(37)

• Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
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• Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
• Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle
• When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds
• Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting
• The replacement principle in networked economies with single-peaked preferences
• Priority, solidarity and egalitarianism
• The division problem under constraints
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• Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• The division problem with voluntary participation
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• Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
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• Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences
• The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
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• Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo
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• The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints
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• The replacement principle and tree structured preferences
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