The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2294zbMath0883.90007OpenAlexW2027956524WikidataQ59972875 ScholiaQ59972875MaRDI QIDQ1371192

William Thomson

Publication date: 28 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2294

zbMATH Keywords

fair allocation of an infinitely divisible commodityreplacement principlewelfare-domination under preference-replacement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

The replacement principle in networked economies with single-peaked preferences, Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof (re)allocation under network constraints, Partnership-enhancement and stability in matching problems, One-sided population monotonicity, separability, and the uniform rule, Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions, All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof, The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints, Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources, Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results, The division problem with voluntary participation, The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences, A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences, Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule, A revealed preference analysis of solutions to simple allocation problems, A characterization of the uniform rule based on new robustness properties, A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents, Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences, Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting, Distributional properties of the uniform rule in economies with single-peaked preferences, Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem, Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked, The replacement principle in bargaining, Priority, solidarity and egalitarianism, Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo, Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria, Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice, When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds, Monotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake-cutting, Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle, Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences, The division problem under constraints, Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle

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