Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.104952zbMath1430.91049OpenAlexW2982535614MaRDI QIDQ2288520

Norovsambuu Tumennasan, Olivier Bochet

Publication date: 20 January 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104952

zbMATH Keywords

latticestrategy-proofnessPareto dominancesequential allotment rulestruthtelling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof ⋮ Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research ⋮ Extended random assignment mechanisms on a family of good sets

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