On a characterization of stable matchings
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Publication:1978730
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00241-4zbMATH Open0953.91048MaRDI QIDQ1978730FDOQ1978730
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
- Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
Cited In (49)
- Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods
- Characterization of super-stable matchings
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- On sequences of iterations of increasing and continuous mappings on complete lattices
- A cumulative offer process for supply chain networks
- Finding all stable matchings with couples
- Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
- On the set of stable matchings in a bipartite graph
- The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts
- The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations
- On stable matchings and flows
- Matching with partially ordered contracts
- Stable matchings and fixed points in trading networks: a note
- On the stability of couples
- Matching with aggregate externalities
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- Stable schedule matchings
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
- von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
- The lattice of envy-free matchings
- On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015)
- Stable matching: An integer programming approach
- Stable matchings with couples
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- On convergence of sequences in complete lattices
- Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
- Stable Matching in Large Economies
- Unique stable matchings
- Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods
- Jointly stable matchings
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- A note on estimation of two-sided matching models
- The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
- Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
- The complexity of Tarski's fixed point theorem
- Structural estimation of pairwise stable networks with nonnegative externality
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope
- Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.
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