On a characterization of stable matchings
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Publication:1978730
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in
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- Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope
- Characterization of super-stable matchings
- On the set of stable matchings in a bipartite graph
- Matching with aggregate externalities
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- On convergence of sequences in complete lattices
- Stable matchings through fixed points and graphs
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- Stable schedule matchings
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- Stable matching in large economies
- On stable matchings and flows
- The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
- Stable matchings with couples
- Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods
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