On a characterization of stable matchings

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00241-4MaRDI QIDQ1978730zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 4 June 2000

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00241-4

zbMATH Keywords

latticestable matchingtwo-sided matchingGale-Shapley marriage problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• A note on stable matchings
• Stable matchings through fixed points and graphs
• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• On stable matchings and flows

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
• Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market

Cited in

(59)

• Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
• Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods
• Characterization of super-stable matchings
• A cumulative offer process for supply chain networks
• Finding all stable matchings with couples
• On sequences of iterations of increasing and continuous mappings on complete lattices
• A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations
• Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
• On the set of stable matchings in a bipartite graph
• The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts
• On stable matchings and flows
• Matching with partially ordered contracts
• A characterization of strongly stable fractional matchings
• Stable matchings and fixed points in trading networks: a note
• On the stability of couples
• Matching with aggregate externalities
• Deferred acceptance with compensation chains
• Stable schedule matchings
• On the existence of stable matchings with contracts
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
• von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
• Stable matchings through fixed points and graphs
• The lattice of envy-free matchings
• A note on stable matchings
• Stability in large markets
• On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015)
• Stable matching: An integer programming approach
• Stable matchings with couples
• Nash equilibrium in stable matching problems
• On convergence of sequences in complete lattices
• Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
• Two-Sided Matching Models
• Unique stable matchings
• College admissions with budget complementarities
• What are stable matchings good for? Stable matchings and their applications
• Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods
• Jointly stable matchings
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• A note on estimation of two-sided matching models
• The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
• Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
• A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
• On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
• The complexity of Tarski's fixed point theorem
• Structural estimation of pairwise stable networks with nonnegative externality
• Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies
• Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
• Stable matching in large economies
• Tâtonnement in matching markets
• Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching
• A number of stable matchings in models of the Gale-Shapley type
• Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
• Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
• A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.

This page was built for publication: On a characterization of stable matchings

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1978730)