Matching with partially ordered contracts
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Recommendations
- A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts
- Matching with contracts: calculation of the complete set of stable allocations
- Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
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Cites work
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
- A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
- A Note on Kelso and Crawford's Gross Substitutes Condition
- A Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market with Possibly Bounded Side Payments: An Approach by Discrete Convex Analysis
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Discrete Convex Analysis
- Gross substitution, discrete convexity, and submodularity
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Matching with partially ordered contracts
- New characterizations of M-convex functions and their applications to economic equilibrium models with indivisibilities.
- On a characterization of stable matchings
- Stable and crossing structures
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
Cited in
(12)- Matching with partially ordered contracts
- Matching with contracts: calculation of the complete set of stable allocations
- Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
- A note on a two-sided discrete-concave market with possibly bounded salaries
- Matching With Complementary Contracts
- Stable marriage with general preferences
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Stable and meta-stable contract networks
- Choice functions on posets
- The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts
- Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
- A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts
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