A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
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Publication:2492196
DOI10.1016/j.dam.2005.10.006zbMath1138.91558OpenAlexW2135652750MaRDI QIDQ2492196
Satoru Fujishige, Akihisa Tamura
Publication date: 9 June 2006
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2005.10.006
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