Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
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Publication:3713894
DOI10.1287/moor.10.3.379zbMath0586.90107OpenAlexW2125034671WikidataQ113239982 ScholiaQ113239982MaRDI QIDQ3713894
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/6ba5adc6aa6fad105a8f2fe0192401d0aa69778a
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