Stable matching: An integer programming approach

DOI10.3982/te4830arXiv2103.03418OpenAlexW3182425737MaRDI QIDQ6053647

Unnamed Author

Publication date: 23 October 2023

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.03418

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityinteger programmingcomplementaritytwo-sided matchingtotal unimodularitymany-to-one matchingdemand type

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Integer programming (90C10) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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