Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching

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Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
Applications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economics
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
Two-sided micro-matching with technical progress
Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
Testing substitutability
Comparative statics in matching markets
Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations
Verifiability and group formation in markets
Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
Matching with contracts: calculation of the complete set of stable allocations
Cumulative offer process is order-independent
Market structure and matching with contracts
A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice
Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
A new proof of the lattice structure of many-to-many pairwise-stable matchings
Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
Rationalizable choice functions
College admissions with stable score-limits
A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
Agreement toward stability in matching markets
Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
Non-cooperative matching games
Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
Multilateral matching
A branch-and-price algorithm for stable workforce assignments with hierarchical skills
A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
An analysis of the German university admissions system
Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
A college admissions clearinghouse
Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept
Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game
A foundation of location theory: existence of equilibrium, the welfare theorems, and core
Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
On the construction of substitutes
Quantile stable mechanisms
Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
Improving solution times for stable matching problems through preprocessing
A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
Testing substitutability of weak preferences
Contracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching
A one-sided many-to-many matching problem
Two-Sided Matching Models
Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
Critical Relaxed Stable Matchings with Two-Sided Ties
Incentives in landing slot problems
A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts
Polynomial time algorithm for an optimal stable assignment with multiple partners
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7278072 (Why is no real title available?)
Expectational equilibria in many-to-one matching models with contracts
Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies
Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets
One-to-many non-cooperative matching games
Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets
Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
Envy-free matchings with lower quotas
Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
WARP and combinatorial choice
Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective
Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences

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