Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
Applications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economics
On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations
A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
Rationalizable choice functions
An analysis of the German university admissions system
School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
Market structure and matching with contracts
Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
Matching with contracts: calculation of the complete set of stable allocations
The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
Testing substitutability
The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
A college admissions clearinghouse
Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
Two-sided micro-matching with technical progress
The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
Multilateral matching
A foundation of location theory: existence of equilibrium, the welfare theorems, and core
Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
Comparative statics in matching markets
An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
Verifiability and group formation in markets
Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
College admissions with stable score-limits
The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
Non-cooperative matching games
On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
On the construction of substitutes
The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
A branch-and-price algorithm for stable workforce assignments with hierarchical skills
Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept
Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game
Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
Quantile stable mechanisms
Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
A new proof of the lattice structure of many-to-many pairwise-stable matchings
A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice
Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
Cumulative offer process is order-independent
A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
Agreement toward stability in matching markets
Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
Envy-free matchings with lower quotas
Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
Counting combinatorial choice rules
Incentives in landing slot problems
Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
Efficient matching under general constraints
Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains
Polynomial time algorithm for an optimal stable assignment with multiple partners
A one-sided many-to-many matching problem
Stable matchings and fixed points in trading networks: a note
Constitutions and groups
Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies
WARP and combinatorial choice
Stable schedule matchings
Improving solution times for stable matching problems through preprocessing
A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
Computing Walrasian equilibria: fast algorithms and structural properties
Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
Gross substitutability: an algorithmic survey
On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings
Job matching and coalition formation with utility or disutility of co-workers
Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
Popular matchings with multiple partners
Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
Matroidal choice functions

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