Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching

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Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
Comparative statics in matching markets
Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets
Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice
Stable matchings and fixed points in trading networks: a note
Gross substitutability: an algorithmic survey
Constitutions and groups
WARP and combinatorial choice
Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game
Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
A college admissions clearinghouse
A foundation of location theory: existence of equilibrium, the welfare theorems, and core
Applications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economics
A simple characterization of responsive choice
Non-cooperative matching games
Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
Market structure and matching with contracts
Envy-free matchings with lower quotas
Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings
Improving solution times for stable matching problems through preprocessing
A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
Quantile stable mechanisms
Matching with contracts: calculation of the complete set of stable allocations
Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets
Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
Rationalizable choice functions
Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective
Multilateral matching
Contracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching
Computing Walrasian equilibria: fast algorithms and structural properties
Refugee allocation in the setting of hedonic games
Verifiability and group formation in markets
Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
Incentives in landing slot problems
Polynomial time algorithm for an optimal stable assignment with multiple partners
Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
One-to-many non-cooperative matching games
A one-sided many-to-many matching problem
Two problems in max-size popular matchings
Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
On the number of employed in the matching model
Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
Stable schedule matchings
Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
Testing substitutability of weak preferences
Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
College admissions with stable score-limits
The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
A branch-and-price algorithm for stable workforce assignments with hierarchical skills
Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept
An analysis of the German university admissions system
On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations
School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
Testing substitutability
On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
Two-sided micro-matching with technical progress
A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
A new proof of the lattice structure of many-to-many pairwise-stable matchings
Strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities
On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
On the construction of substitutes
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7278072 (Why is no real title available?)
Popular matchings with multiple partners
Two-Sided Matching Models
Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
Matroidal choice functions

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