Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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Publication:3040872
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
- Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
- A new proof of the lattice structure of many-to-many pairwise-stable matchings
- Testing substitutability of weak preferences
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
- On the number of employed in the matching model
- Refugee allocation in the setting of hedonic games
- Critical Relaxed Stable Matchings with Two-Sided Ties
- The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective
- On the Lattice Structure of Stable Allocations in a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market
- A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice
- Strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities
- Two problems in max-size popular matchings
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
- Cumulative offer process is order-independent
- A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
- Agreement toward stability in matching markets
- Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
- Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets
- Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
- Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
- Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
- Envy-free matchings with lower quotas
- Counting combinatorial choice rules
- Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
- On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Incentives in landing slot problems
- Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
- Applications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economics
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
- The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
- Efficient matching under general constraints
- Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains
- Polynomial time algorithm for an optimal stable assignment with multiple partners
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Rationalizable choice functions
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- A one-sided many-to-many matching problem
- Market structure and matching with contracts
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- Stable matchings and fixed points in trading networks: a note
- Constitutions and groups
- Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- WARP and combinatorial choice
- Matching with contracts: calculation of the complete set of stable allocations
- Stable schedule matchings
- On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
- Testing substitutability
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- Improving solution times for stable matching problems through preprocessing
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
- A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
- Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- A college admissions clearinghouse
- Computing Walrasian equilibria: fast algorithms and structural properties
- Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
- Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
- Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Gross substitutability: an algorithmic survey
- On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings
- Two-sided micro-matching with technical progress
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Job matching and coalition formation with utility or disutility of co-workers
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- A foundation of location theory: existence of equilibrium, the welfare theorems, and core
- Multilateral matching
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Verifiability and group formation in markets
- Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- A simple characterization of responsive choice
- Popular matchings with multiple partners
- College admissions with stable score-limits
- The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
- Matroidal choice functions
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- Stable matching: An integer programming approach
- Non-cooperative matching games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7278072 (Why is no real title available?)
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
- Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
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