Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.10.002zbMATH Open1393.91118arXiv2102.04337OpenAlexW3124840407MaRDI QIDQ523004FDOQ523004

Authors: Federico Echenique, Alfred Galichon 

Publication date: 20 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade matching is one in which the availability of transfers do not affect the outcome.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.04337

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zbMATH Keywords

market designmatching theorynational resident matching program

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• The assignment game. I: The core
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• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
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Cited In (3)

• Stable fractional matchings
• An enhanced approach for two-sided matching with 2-tuple linguistic multi-attribute preference
• Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems

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