Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.10.002MaRDI QIDQ523004zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Federico Echenique, Alfred Galichon

Publication date 20 April 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.04337, https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/t2p3rkl1d8gqrqvgeigklj2qg

zbMATH Keywords

market designmatching theorynational resident matching program

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Abstract: We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade matching is one in which the availability of transfers do not affect the outcome.

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(3)

• Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
• Stable fractional matchings
• An enhanced approach for two-sided matching with 2-tuple linguistic multi-attribute preference

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