Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
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Publication:523004
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.10.002zbMath1393.91118arXiv2102.04337OpenAlexW3124840407MaRDI QIDQ523004
Federico Echenique, Alfred Galichon
Publication date: 20 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.04337
Related Items (3)
Stable fractional matchings ⋮ Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems ⋮ An enhanced approach for two-sided matching with 2-tuple linguistic multi-attribute preference
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