Stable fractional matchings
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2238635
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2020.103416OpenAlexW3095654954MaRDI QIDQ2238635
Rohit Vaish, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Ioannis Caragiannis
Publication date: 2 November 2021
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.06698
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
- Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems
- Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
- Complexity of the sex-equal stable marriage problem
- Stable marriage with ties and bounded length preference lists
- Linear programming brings marital bliss
- Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope
- A new fixed point approach for stable networks and stable marriages
- On a lemma of Scarf.
- Hard variants of stable marriage.
- ``Almost-stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem with couples
- Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences
- Mathematical models for stable matching problems with ties and incomplete lists
- Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with applications to stable matchings
- Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
- Multilateral matching
- Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- The Geometry of Fractional Stable Matchings and Its Applications
- Kidney Exchange
- A Constraint Programming Approach to the Hospitals / Residents Problem
- An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
- Three Fast Algorithms for Four Problems in Stable Marriage
- Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
- Approximating Nash Equilibria and Dense Subgraphs via an Approximate Version of Carathéodory's Theorem
- Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study
- The Maximum-Weight Stable Matching Problem: Duality and Efficiency
- Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Term Rewriting and Applications
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
This page was built for publication: Stable fractional matchings
