Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences
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Publication:1736594
DOI10.3390/a6040782zbMath1461.05170OpenAlexW2074498497MaRDI QIDQ1736594
Francesca Rossi, Maria Silvia Pini, Toby Walsh, Kristen Brent Venable
Publication date: 26 March 2019
Published in: Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/a6040782
Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (4)
Local search approaches in stable matching problems ⋮ Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences ⋮ Editorial: Special issue on matching under preferences ⋮ Stable fractional matchings
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