Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3007558
DOI10.1613/jair.3186zbMath1218.91040arXiv1401.3876MaRDI QIDQ3007558
Publication date: 16 June 2011
Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.3876
91B12: Voting theory
68Q17: Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.)
03B80: Other applications of logic
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