Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders

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Publication:3007558

DOI10.1613/jair.3186zbMath1218.91040arXiv1401.3876OpenAlexW1611302770WikidataQ129517944 ScholiaQ129517944MaRDI QIDQ3007558

Vincent Conitzer, Lirong Xia

Publication date: 16 June 2011

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.3876




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