Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3888913 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1507224 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2234775 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Complexity of judgment aggregation
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- Computational aspects of manipulation and control in judgment aggregation
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- Fair division under ordinal preferences: computing envy-free allocations of indivisible goods
- How hard is bribery in elections?
- How hard is it to bribe the judges? A study of the complexity of bribery in judgment aggregation
- Judgment aggregation
- Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation
- Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Methods for distance-based judgment aggregation
- On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
- On miniaturized problems in parameterized complexity theory
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- Search versus decision for election manipulation problems
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- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- Strategyproof approximation of the minimax on networks
- Swap bribery
- Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
- The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions
- The complexity of probabilistic lobbying
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
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- The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review
- Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Cited in
(16)- The possible winner with uncertain weights problem
- The complexity landscape of outcome determination in judgment aggregation
- Approximation and hardness of shift-bribery
- The possible winner problem with uncertain weights revisited
- How hard is it to bribe the judges? A study of the complexity of bribery in judgment aggregation
- Complexity of judgment aggregation
- Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
- Complexity of manipulation and bribery in premise-based judgment aggregation with simple formulas
- The complexity of priced control in elections
- Structural control in weighted voting games
- Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
- Complexity of bribery and control for uniform premise-based quota rules under various preference types
- Computational aspects of manipulation and control in judgment aggregation
- Manipulation and bribery when aggregating ranked preferences
- Verification in incomplete argumentation frameworks
- Path-disruption games: bribery and a probabilistic model
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