Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.03.006zbMATH Open1331.91063OpenAlexW2014337128MaRDI QIDQ898752FDOQ898752

Authors: Dorothea Baumeister, Gábor Erdélyi, Olivia J. Erdélyi, Jörg Rothe 

Publication date: 18 December 2015

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.03.006

Recommendations

• Complexity of bribery and control for uniform premise-based quota rules under various preference types
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• Complexity of judgment aggregation
• Computational aspects of manipulation and control in judgment aggregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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Cited In (12)

• How hard is it to bribe the judges? A study of the complexity of bribery in judgment aggregation
• The possible winner problem with uncertain weights revisited
• Complexity of manipulation and bribery in premise-based judgment aggregation with simple formulas
• Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
• The complexity of priced control in elections
• Approximation and hardness of shift-Bribery
• Structural control in weighted voting games
• Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
• The Complexity Landscape of Outcome Determination in Judgment Aggregation
• Verification in incomplete argumentation frameworks
• Path-disruption games: bribery and a probabilistic model
• The possible winner with uncertain weights problem

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