Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules

Cites Work

Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems
Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
How Hard Is it to Bribe the Judges? A Study of the Complexity of Bribery in Judgment Aggregation
Complexity of Judgment Aggregation
The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review
Methods for distance-based judgment aggregation
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders
Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
Fair division of indivisible items
On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
Search versus Decision for Election Manipulation Problems
Swap Bribery
Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
Barriers to Manipulation in Voting
Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
Complexity theory and cryptology. An introduction to cryptocomplexity.
The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions
On miniaturized problems in parameterized complexity theory
Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
Fair Division under Ordinal Preferences: Computing Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Goods
Judgment Aggregation
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation
The complexity of probabilistic lobbying
Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems
Computational Aspects of Manipulation and Control in Judgment Aggregation

Cited In (11)

The possible winner problem with uncertain weights revisited
Complexity of manipulation and bribery in premise-based judgment aggregation with simple formulas
Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
The complexity of priced control in elections
Approximation and hardness of shift-Bribery
Structural control in weighted voting games
Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
The Complexity Landscape of Outcome Determination in Judgment Aggregation
Verification in incomplete argumentation frameworks
Path-disruption games: bribery and a probabilistic model
The possible winner with uncertain weights problem

This page was built for publication: Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q898752)