Cites work
- A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Approval voting: three examples
- Approximability of Dodgson's rule
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Dichotomy for voting systems
- Exact analysis of Dodgson elections
- Exact complexity of the winner problem for Young elections
- Frequency of correctness versus average polynomial time
- Generalized juntas and NP-hard sets
- Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
- Guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding Dodgson-election winners
- How hard is it to control an election?
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
Cited in
(20)- The complexity of probabilistic lobbying
- Resolute control: forbidding candidates from winning an election is hard
- Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
- Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers
- Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- A statistical approach to calibrating the scores of biased reviewers of scientific papers
- Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
- On the hardness of bribery variants in voting with CP-nets
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Normalized range voting broadly resists control
- Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
- Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
- Search versus search for collapsing electoral control types
- Binary linear programming solutions and non-approximability for control problems in voting systems
- Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
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