Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_10zbMATH Open1348.91101OpenAlexW1528175708MaRDI QIDQ2829683FDOQ2829683
Authors: Dorothea Baumeister, Gábor Erdélyi, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jörg Rothe 
Publication date: 8 November 2016
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/6722
Social choice (91B14) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Voting theory (91B12) Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-08)
Cites Work
- Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
- How hard is it to control an election?
- Exact complexity of the winner problem for Young elections
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- Exact analysis of Dodgson elections
- Dichotomy for voting systems
- Approval voting: three examples
- A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Generalized juntas and NP-hard sets
- Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
- Guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding Dodgson-election winners
- Approximability of Dodgson's rule
- Frequency of correctness versus average polynomial time
Cited In (20)
- Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
- A statistical approach to calibrating the scores of biased reviewers of scientific papers
- Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
- Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
- The complexity of probabilistic lobbying
- Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
- Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers
- Resolute control: forbidding candidates from winning an election is hard
- Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
- On the hardness of bribery variants in voting with CP-nets
- Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Binary linear programming solutions and non-approximability for control problems in voting systems
- Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
- FPT approximation schemes for maximizing submodular functions
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- Normalized range voting broadly resists control
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