Dichotomy for voting systems
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Publication:859982
DOI10.1016/j.jcss.2006.09.002zbMath1154.91381OpenAlexW1977012944MaRDI QIDQ859982
Edith Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, Lane A.
Publication date: 22 January 2007
Published in: Journal of Computer and System Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2006.09.002
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