Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting

DOI10.1007/S10472-010-9205-YzbMATH Open1207.68401OpenAlexW2118929269MaRDI QIDQ616771FDOQ616771

Authors: Vincent Conitzer 

Publication date: 12 January 2011

Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-010-9205-y

Recommendations

• Combinatorial auctions
• Design issues for combinatorial auctions
• Combinatorial auctions
• Multi-agent Systems and Voting: How Similar Are Voting Procedures
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5017566

zbMATH Keywords

votingmultiagent systemscombinatorial auctionscomputational social choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to computer science (68-02) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Computationally manageable combinational auctions
• Linear degree extractors and the inapproximability of max clique and chromatic number
• A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Ranking Tournaments
• Communication Complexity
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Undominated Groves mechanisms
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• The Minimum Feedback Arc Set Problem is NP-Hard for Tournaments
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
• Constrained multi-object auctions and \(b\)-matching
• Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
• Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
• Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
• How hard is it to control an election?
• Exact complexity of the winner problem for Young elections
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• Multiagent resource allocation in \(k\)-additive domains: preference representation and complexity
• Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
• Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
• How hard is bribery in elections?
• Exact analysis of Dodgson elections
• Algorithms and Computation
• Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation: complexity results
• BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations
• Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
• Dichotomy for voting systems
• The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
• Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism
• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products
• Aggregating inconsistent information
• Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids
• Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
• Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
• False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives
• The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
• Aggregating Partially Ordered Preferences
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Fair imposition
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
• Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
• Automated design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions
• Learning Theory
• Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of Hamming type
• Borda and the maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation
• Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
• Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
• Tractable combinatorial auctions and \(b\)-matching
• Preference elicitation and query learning
• Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms

Cited In (3)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
• Preferences of agents in decentralized task allocation

Uses Software

• CP-nets

This page was built for publication: Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q616771)