Constrained multi-object auctions and b-matching
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Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Matching models (91B68)
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19089 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3499169 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3566230 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3637616 (Why is no real title available?)
- A polynomial algorithm for b-matchings: An alternative approach
- Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
- Computationally manageable combinational auctions
- Linear Systems for Constrained Matching Problems
Cited in
(9)- The \(b\)-\textsc{Matching} problem in distance-hereditary graphs and beyond
- Fuzzy formulation of auctions and optimal sequencing for multiple auctions.
- Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
- On multi-object auctions and matching theory: algorithmic aspects
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1927296 (Why is no real title available?)
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
- Tractable combinatorial auctions and \(b\)-matching
- Side constraints and non-price attributes in markets
- The complexity of mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions: tractability under structural and qualitative restrictions
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