Constrained multi-object auctions and b-matching
DOI10.1016/S0020-0190(00)00073-9zbMATH Open1339.68121OpenAlexW1987571835MaRDI QIDQ294790FDOQ294790
Authors: Moshe Tennenholtz, Michal Penn 
Publication date: 16 June 2016
Published in: Information Processing Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0020019000000739?np=y
Recommendations
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
- Computationally manageable combinational auctions
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- A polynomial algorithm for b-matchings: An alternative approach
- Linear Systems for Constrained Matching Problems
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- Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Cited In (9)
- The \(b\)-\textsc{Matching} problem in distance-hereditary graphs and beyond
- Fuzzy formulation of auctions and optimal sequencing for multiple auctions.
- Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
- On multi-object auctions and matching theory: algorithmic aspects
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
- Tractable combinatorial auctions and \(b\)-matching
- Side constraints and non-price attributes in markets
- The complexity of mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions: tractability under structural and qualitative restrictions
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