Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
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Publication:835815
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2008.11.005zbMath1187.91062MaRDI QIDQ835815
Michael Zuckerman, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Ariel D. Procaccia
Publication date: 31 August 2009
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2008.11.005
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