How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1887542
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.09.007zbMath1140.91348MaRDI QIDQ1887542
Publication date: 22 November 2004
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.09.007
91B14: Social choice
Related Items
Cites Work
- A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
- The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
- The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules
- On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
- On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- A variance method in combinatorial number theory