On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
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Publication:2567915
DOI10.1007/s003550100113zbMath1072.91551OpenAlexW2059331247MaRDI QIDQ2567915
Publication date: 14 October 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100113
Voting theory (91B12) Group preferences (91B10) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (8)
How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election? ⋮ Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules ⋮ On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences ⋮ Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey ⋮ Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations ⋮ How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election ⋮ Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains ⋮ Social Choice Theory
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