Social Choice Theory
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Publication:5150296
DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_666zbMath1458.91079OpenAlexW3080348382MaRDI QIDQ5150296
Publication date: 15 February 2021
Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_666
characterizationsliberalismstrategy-proofnessimpossibility theoremsArrow's impossibility theoremvoting methodsaggregation rulessingle peakednesssocial choice functionschaos theorems
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