Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. II: Positional voting
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Publication:1969021
DOI10.1007/s001990050002zbMath1081.91007OpenAlexW3122331923WikidataQ56553626 ScholiaQ56553626MaRDI QIDQ1969021
Publication date: 22 June 2000
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050002
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