Dependence and Independence in Social Choice: Arrow’s Theorem
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- A reason-based theory of rational choice
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence
- An Impossibility Theorem for Fixed Preferences: A Dictatorial Bergson- Samuelson Welfare Function
- Arrow’s Theorem by Arrow Theory
- Axiomatizing first-order consequences in dependence logic
- Axiomatizing first-order consequences in independence logic
- Chaotic elections! A mathematician looks at voting
- Computer-aided proofs of Arrow's and other impossibility theorems
- Dependence and independence
- Dependence logic. A new approach to independence friendly logic
- First-order logic formalisation of impossibility theorems in preference aggregation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3724161 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2182815 (Why is no real title available?)
- Inclusion and exclusion dependencies in team semantics -- on some logics of imperfect information
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. II: Positional voting
- Modal dependence logic
- On definability in dependence logic
- On natural deduction in dependence logic
- Reasoning about social choice functions
- Robust normative systems and a logic of norm compliance
- Social choice and individual values
- Social Choice Theory: The Single-Profile and Multi-Profile Approaches
- Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- The model-theoretic approach to aggregation: impossibility results for finite and infinite electorates
- The Single Profile Analogues to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logic's Approach
- Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem
Cited in
(14)- Democracy and efficiency: A note on ``Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result
- Voting theory in the Lean theorem prover
- Arrow's decisive coalitions
- Independent social choice correspondences
- A finite axiomatization of conditional independence and inclusion dependencies
- First-order logic formalisation of Arrow's theorem
- First-order logic formalisation of impossibility theorems in preference aggregation
- A Conflict Tolerant Logic of Explicit Evidence
- Counting of Teams in First-Order Team Logics
- Axiomatizing first order consequences in inclusion logic
- Complexity thresholds in inclusion logic
- COMPLETE LOGICS FOR ELEMENTARY TEAM PROPERTIES
- Modular SAT-based techniques for reasoning tasks in team semantics
- Counting of teams in first-order team logics
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