scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025107

MaRDI QIDQ3767083zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Algis Morkeliūnas

Publication date 1985

zbMATH Keywords

dictatorshipindependence of irrelevant alternativesweak version of neutrality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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(5)

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• Independent social choice correspondences
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• Dependence and Independence in Social Choice: Arrow’s Theorem

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