scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025107
The author writes that he proves that a social choice function satisfying a weak version of neutrality and independence of irrelevant alternatives can be defined in terms of dictatorial-antidictatorial lexicographic order. \{Reviewer's comments: According to the author independence and the Pareto condition lead to dictatorship. Obviously, the author makes a confusion between independence in the usual Arrowian sense and another independence condition relative to choice functions called condition C4 by \textit{K. J. Arrow} [Economica 26, 121--127 (1959)]. In this paper, it is the C4 condition which is used and not the condition leading to dictatorship. Further it seems difficult to follow the author in his use of functions defined on different sets in pages 57 and 58 and of what seems to be utility functions somewhere becoming something else a few lines after.\}
- Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
- Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle
- Social choice and individual values
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5308074
- Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions.
- Independent social choice correspondences
- Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7300319 (Why is no real title available?)
- Dependence and Independence in Social Choice: Arrow’s Theorem
This page was built for publication:
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3767083)