Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00002-5MaRDI QIDQ1964744zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors L. A. Sholomov

Publication date 2000

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00002-5

zbMATH Keywords

Aggregation operatorArrow theoremNormative constraintsOrdinal relationRationality conditionsSocial choiceSocial decision rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Quasilocal collective choice operators
• Aggregation of linear ordering relations in group choice problems
• Method of interpretations in the problem of the synthesis of operators of group choice
• Voting operators in the space of choice functions
• Structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with quasi-transitive individual preferences

Cites work

• Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle
• An Axiomatic Theory of Tournament Aggregation
• Axioms for Lexicographic Preferences
• Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
• Hierarchical voting
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3924457 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3945819 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025107 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 41738 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 193828 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 195042 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 850317 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 850398 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3339023 (Why is no real title available?)
• Operators over relations preserving transitivity
• Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
• Semiorders and collective choice
• Social choice and individual values
• Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• The Arrow paradox in group choice theory (analysis of the problem)
• The structure of neutral monotonic social functions

Cited in

(12)

• Quasilocal collective choice operators
• Conditional extensions of fuzzy preorders
• Consensus functions on tree quasi-orders that satisfy an independence condition
• On the continuous analogue of the Szpilrajn theorem. I
• Aggregation of linear ordering relations in group choice problems
• The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7300319 (Why is no real title available?)
• Properties underlying a preference aggregator based on satisficing logic
• Choice Functions on Tree Quasi-Orders
• Method of interpretations in the problem of the synthesis of operators of group choice
• Structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with quasi-transitive individual preferences
• On a possible continuous analogue of the Szpilrajn theorem and its strengthening by Dushnik and Miller

This page was built for publication: Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions.

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1964744)