An Axiomatic Theory of Tournament Aggregation

DOI10.1287/MOOR.3.4.334MaRDI QIDQ4178728zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bernard Monjardet

Publication date 1978

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.3.4.334

zbMATH Keywords

PreferencesSimple GamesSocial ChoiceTournament AgGregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Ordered sets (06A99) Individual preferences (91B08)

Cited in

(19)

• Aggregation of preferences: a review
• The median procedure in cluster analysis and social choice theory
• Arrow's theorem: Unusual domains and extended codomains
• Consensus weak hierarchies
• The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree
• Arrowian characterizations of latticial federation consensus functions
• Consensus functions defined on trees
• Stability conditions for consensus functions defined on \(n\)-trees
• Maximal Condorcet domains
• Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions.
• Majority rule on rhombus tilings and Condorcet super-domains
• Distance and consensus for preference relations corresponding to ordered partitions
• The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 895060 (Why is no real title available?)
• SOME ORDER DUALITIES IN LOGIC, GAMES AND CHOICES
• Solving the Kemeny ranking aggregation problem with quantum optimization algorithms
• Heights of simple games
• Faithful consensus methods for n-trees
• Computational application of the mathematical theory of democracy to Arrow's impossibility theorem (how dictatorial are Arrow's dictators?)

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