Semiorders and collective choice
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Publication:754093
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90013-9zbMath0415.90012OpenAlexW2087833917MaRDI QIDQ754093
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90013-9
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- Foundational aspects of theories of measurement
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- Semiorders and Choice Functions
- Social Decision Functions and the Veto
- The Nature of Equilibrium with Semiordered Preferences
- Semiorders and the Theory of Choice
- A Direct Proof of Arrow's Theorem
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