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- A Direct Proof of Arrow's Theorem
- Choice functions, rationality conditions, and variations on the weak axiom of revealed preference
- Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
- Foundational aspects of theories of measurement
- Interval representations for interval orders and semiorders
- On the theory of aggregation
- Semiorders and Choice Functions
- Semiorders and a Theory of Utility Discrimination
- Semiorders and the Theory of Choice
- Social Decision Functions and the Veto
- Social choice and individual values
- The Existence of Social Welfare Functions
- The Nature of Equilibrium with Semiordered Preferences
- Voting and group decision functions
Cited in
(21)- Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
- Arrovian social choice with psychological thresholds
- Some algebraic characterizations of preference structures
- Arrow's theorem: Unusual domains and extended codomains
- Rights revisited, and limited
- Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem
- Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
- Incomplete decision-making and Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem
- Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions.
- Acyclic and positive responsive social choice with infinite individuals. An alternative `invisible dictator' theorem
- Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
- Collective choice rules with social maximality
- The median procedure in cluster analysis and social choice theory
- Two impossibility results for social choice under individual indifference intransitivity
- Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions
- Arrow's decisive coalitions
- Weak independence and the Pareto principle
- Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
- Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
- Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence
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