Semiorders and collective choice
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Publication:754093
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90013-9zbMATH Open0415.90012OpenAlexW2087833917MaRDI QIDQ754093FDOQ754093
Authors: Julian H. Blau 
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90013-9
Cites Work
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Cited In (21)
- Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions
- Acyclic and positive responsive social choice with infinite individuals. An alternative `invisible dictator' theorem
- Collective choice rules with social maximality
- Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
- Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
- Arrovian social choice with psychological thresholds
- Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
- Arrow's theorem: Unusual domains and extended codomains
- Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem
- Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
- Two impossibility results for social choice under individual indifference intransitivity
- Incomplete decision-making and Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Weak independence and the Pareto principle
- Rights revisited, and limited
- Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem
- Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions.
- Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
- Some algebraic characterizations of preference structures
- Arrow's decisive coalitions
- Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence
- The median procedure in cluster analysis and social choice theory
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