Incomplete decision-making and Arrow's impossibility theorem
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Publication:1645208
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.10.002zbMath1395.91165OpenAlexW2767479494MaRDI QIDQ1645208
Publication date: 28 June 2018
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.10.002
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Cites Work
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