Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem

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Publication:1780915

DOI10.1007/s00199-004-0556-7zbMath1097.91031OpenAlexW3123461587WikidataQ55922379 ScholiaQ55922379MaRDI QIDQ1780915

John D. Geanakoplos

Publication date: 14 June 2005

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d11/d1123-r3.pdf




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