Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
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Publication:989978
DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0440-2zbMATH Open1194.91076OpenAlexW1989833334MaRDI QIDQ989978FDOQ989978
Authors: Susumu Cato 
Publication date: 23 August 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0440-2
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- Generalized Rawlsianism
- Arrow's theorem as a corollary
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- A projection property and Arrow's impossibility theorem
- A pedagogical proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem
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