Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
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Publication:989978
DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0440-2zbMath1194.91076MaRDI QIDQ989978
Publication date: 23 August 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0440-2
91B14: Social choice
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