Social Decision Functions and the Veto

Cited in

(26)

Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
Some impossibility results with domain restrictions
Independent, neutral, and monotonic collective choice: the role of Suzumura consistency
The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
The structure of social decision functions
Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle
Vetoing: social, logical and mathematical aspects
Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case
A dynamic simulation comparing classical and emergent-network models: organizational design implications
Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions.
The structure of neutral monotonic social functions
Structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with quasi-transitive individual preferences
On effectively computable realizations of choice functions
Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice
Acyclic choice and group veto
Semiorders and collective choice
Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules
Aggregation of preferences: a review
Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
Utility and the individual: An analysis of internal conflicts

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