Social Decision Functions and the Veto

Cited In (26)

Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
Semiorders and collective choice
On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
Utility and the individual: An analysis of internal conflicts
Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle
Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice
Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
Vetoing: social, logical and mathematical aspects
On effectively computable realizations of choice functions
Independent, neutral, and monotonic collective choice: the role of Suzumura consistency
Aggregation of preferences: a review
Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
The structure of social decision functions
Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions.
Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
Structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with quasi-transitive individual preferences
The structure of neutral monotonic social functions
On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
Acyclic choice and group veto
Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case
A dynamic simulation comparing classical and emergent-network models: organizational design implications
Some impossibility results with domain restrictions
Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules

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