Independent, neutral, and monotonic collective choice: the role of Suzumura consistency

DOI10.1007/S00355-023-01472-4MaRDI QIDQ6062965zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Walter Bossert, Susumu Cato, Kohei Kamaga

Publication date 6 November 2023

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01472-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A characterization of consistent collective choice rules
• Acyclic social choice from finite sets
• Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters
• Expected utility without full transitivity
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3976693 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3326329 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the Consistency of Libertarian Claims
• Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
• Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
• Social choice and individual values
• Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• Superset-robust collective choice rules
• Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population

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