Recommendations
Cites work
- A characterization of consistent collective choice rules
- A Note on the Complete Independence of the Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A unifying impossibility theorem
- Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
- Arrow's theorem and Turing computability
- Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3326329 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- May's theorem in an infinite setting
- May's theorem with an infinite population
- On the impossibility of representing infinite utility streams
- Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
- Social choice and individual values
- Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
- Ultraproducts and aggregation
- Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population
Cited in
(5)- Preference aggregation and atoms in measures
- Stable preference aggregation with infinite population
- Independent, neutral, and monotonic collective choice: the role of Suzumura consistency
- An axiomatic characterization of the proportional threshold methods: a geometric approach
- Filters in abstract aggregation with infinite sequences of signals
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