Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
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Publication:2628710
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1025-0zbMath1392.91069OpenAlexW2574343676MaRDI QIDQ2628710
Shino Takayama, Akira Yokotani
Publication date: 2 June 2017
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1025-0
Related Items
Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population, Quasi-stationary social welfare functions, Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence, Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters, Superset-robust collective choice rules, Preference aggregation and atoms in measures, The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population
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