Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence
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Publication:1704411
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1085-1zbMath1392.91050OpenAlexW2760355763MaRDI QIDQ1704411
Publication date: 9 March 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1085-1
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