Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence
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Publication:1704411
DOI10.1007/S00355-017-1085-1zbMATH Open1392.91050OpenAlexW2760355763MaRDI QIDQ1704411FDOQ1704411
Authors: Susumu Cato 
Publication date: 9 March 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1085-1
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 699704
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Cited In (5)
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