Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations

DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0420-6zbMath1202.91072OpenAlexW2083293720MaRDI QIDQ964823

Daisuke Hirata, Susumu Cato

Publication date: 21 April 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0420-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Weak independence and the Pareto principle ⋮ On the limits of democracy ⋮ Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis ⋮ Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings ⋮ Conditions on social-preference cycles ⋮ Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support ⋮ Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness ⋮ Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions ⋮ Properties underlying a preference aggregator based on satisficing logic

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• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
• Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions

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